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14.1 Introduction 
The quantity of effective labor in the work force depends not only on the 
number of workers employed but on how hard they work. Many explanations 
of the superior performance of the Japanese economy stress this fact. Japanese 
workers seem more dedicated and motivated than their American counter- 
parts. We examine this phenomenon by comparing the effects of worker atti- 
tude on productivity and production costs in the U.S. and Japanese manufac- 
turing sector. The findings suggest that worker attitude affects economic 
growth.' 
In analyzing the effects of worker behavior on automobile industry per- 
formance-total factor productivity, labor productivity, and total unit cost- 
for the 1959-76 period, we simulated the effects of a 10% improvement in 
worker attitudes on industry performance (Norsworthy and Zabala 1985b). 
We found that positive changes in attitudes would have resulted in substantial 
cost savings over the last two decades. In 1976, for example, the estimated 
cost savings for automobile manufactures were approximately $5 .O billion. 
We also investigated worker-attitude effects on the shadow value of total cap- 
ital input, assuming a significant capital-using effect from negative worker 
behavior in auto plants (Norsworthy and Zabala 198%). A 10% improvement 
in worker behavior would save between $1 .O billion and $6.0 billion between 
1959 and 1979. Thus, poor worker attitudes caused a large capital-using bias 
in technology and, thus, increased capital requirements. These results are 
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strong and suggest consideration of similar patterns in other models of pro- 
duction. 
In this paper, we extend our method to study the aggregate manufacturing 
sectors of Japan and the United States using comparable worker-behavior 
data. We expect significant differences between these two countries in behav- 
ioral effects on productivity and costs because of differences in industrial re- 
lations, management systems, and other institutions. We also expect to find 
significant differences in investment behavior that affects productivity and cost 
performance, as found in Norsworthy and Malmquist (1983). 
In the following sections, we first discuss differences in institutional set- 
tings and industrial relations practices. Second, we introduce the variables 
used to depict workers’ attitudes toward their jobs; these variables reflect in- 
stitutional and systemic differences between the two countries and describe 
the cost and output data. Third, we introduce the translog cost function 
model, which is used to estimate the effects of worker behavior on the cost of 
production. Fourth, we present the estimation results and compare the esti- 
mated influences of worker attitudes on manufacturing productivity in the two 
countries. 
14.2 How Worker Attitudes Affect Productivity and Costs 
Worker attitudes affect not only labor productivity but also the productivity 
of other input factors. The mechanisms by which worker attitudes affect pro- 
ductivity and costs is important. The transaction-costs literature discusses 
deals with “shirking” or output restriction by workers and argues that without 
very close supervision-in the limit, one supervisor per worker-the worker 
has discretionary control over the quality, and even the quantity, of effort and 
concentration applied to his job. There is scope for the worker to manifest 
dissatisfaction in various forms of low-grade sabotage (Zabala 1983, 1989), 
which may take the form of breakage (increasing materials costs), letting ma- 
chines break down through inattention, omitted adjustment or maintenance 
(increasing maintenance and/or materials costs), and absenteeism (increasing 
labor costs). These behaviors will typically increase the costs of supervision. 
While some of behavior of this type may be partially unintentional, there is 
little reason to doubt that dissatisfaction or alienation will generally give rise 
to more of it, resulting in higher costs and possibly a reduction in the quality 
of output. 
14.3 Institutional Setting of Industrial Relations 
Many institutions created for the resolution of labor-management conflict 
in Japan and the United States have similar outward forms, due in large mea- 
sure to U.S. influence on Japan’s reshaping of its economic institutions in the 
decade following World War I1 (Hanami 1981). However, the Japanese union 
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movements and their respective relations with management are quite different 
and, consequently, have different historical experiences that may result in dif- 
ferent workplace behavior. (Shimada 1982a). In Japan, there are two major 
labor federations with social as well as political agendas, while in the United 
States there is one major labor federation, linked principally, although not 
formally, to one national political party. Some 25%-30% of Japanese workers, 
mostly in manufacturing, are aligned with the conservative majority in the 
Diet. Public-sector unions are more militant and aligned with the minority 
left-of-center political parties. 
There are other important differences between Japanese and U.S. institu- 
tional structures for managing labor-management conflict. While many U.S. 
manufacturing industries are organized by industrywide unions, such as the 
United Auto Workers, United Steel Workers, International Association of Ma- 
chinists, and so on, Japanese manufacturing workers are represented by 
unions that typically cover only one large enterprise. Among small- and 
medium-sized firms, the pattern is different and more similar to the one in the 
United States. Under these circumstances, the Japanese union has less bar- 
gaining leverage in terms of political power. Outside manufacturing, industry- 
wide unions are more common, and many are considerably more militant than 
the unions in the manufacturing sector. 
Since the early 1970s, annual nationwide wage negotiations, called the 
shun-to (spring offensive), set general wage levels across industries; typically, 
the largest unions in industry negotiate rates at their firm. This is followed by 
pattern bargaining at other firms. Instead of mass strikes and production stop- 
pages, the shun-to is accompanied by mass demonstrations, intended to show 
power and solidarity, and by public bargaining between unions and employers 
that is reported in the national press. This public debate provides information 
and time for nonadversary bargaining when both parties sit down face to face. 
The shun-to is also used to set the nation’s social agenda. For example, in the 
early 1970s a movement emerged, in response to changing demographics, 
demanding that the government raise the retirement age for Japanese public- 
sector workers from 55 to 60 years of age. Militant public-sector unions raised 
these demands in the shun-to. This in turn shaped a national debate that 
spilled over into Japanese manufacturing with the demand to raise the retire- 
ment age for all full-time Japanese workers. The debate extended beyond col- 
lective bargaining to concerns about income support programs-an inade- 
quate social security system and nonexistent private-sector pension programs 
for an aging Japanese labor force with an increasing life expectancy (from 50 
years in 1947 to 70 years in 1973 for men)-and future expectations of labor 
shortages. 
While its present widespread influence is rather recent, the shun-to has af- 
fected the data for Japan in the last few years. In the United States, triennial 
industrywide pattern bargaining is a major influence on labor policy develop- 
ment. In Japan, social and political agendas of the main federation in the labor 
movement are more widely publicized and discussed than in the United 
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States, where a tradition of business unionism continues to exert strong influ- 
ence. Finally, overt labor-management conflict in Japanese labor relations is 
uncommon in the manufacturing sector (Lam 1983), compared to the adver- 
sarial nature of U. S. collective bargaining. 
Differences in national institutions can be expected to result in different 
patterns of labor-management conflict and in different structures and pro- 
cesses of nominally similar institutions in workplace bargaining. The time 
required for final adjudication of disputes in the two countries is dramatically 
different: the process takes much longer in Japan. The empirical evidence we 
have developed is consistent with the proposition that Japan’s system of con- 
flict resolution is more effective, but it is also consistent with lower levels of 
latent conflict in labor-management relations in Japan’s manufacturing sector. 
14.4 Structure and Processes in Dispute-Resolution Procedures 
Dispute adjustment and resolution of unfair labor practices in the manufac- 
turing sector are similar in both countries. 
14.4.1 National Dispute-Resolution Institutions in the United States 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), created and guided by the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act, 1935, which was 
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 1947), collects U.S. dispute resolution data 
routinely and reports them in the Annual Report of the National Labor Rela- 
tions Board. The board does not initiate cases but acts only on those cases 
submitted by the company, union, or employee to administer of the basic laws 
governing the relationships between management and trade unions. Dispute- 
adjustment cases include representation disputes, for example, for determin- 
ing collective bargaining representatives, changes in union affiliation, advis- 
ory opinions on the board’s jurisdiction in regional or state agency or court 
disputes, unit clarification disputes involving employee classifications in ex- 
isting bargaining units, or jurisdictional disputes and union deauthorization 
cases. Unfair labor practices include charges by unions and employees that 
employers interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in exercising 
their legally sanctioned rights of self-organization; dominated or interfered 
with either the formation or administration of unions; discriminated in hiring 
or tenure of employment or discourage membership in a labor organization; 
discharged or otherwise discriminated against an employee because the em- 
ployee filed unfair labor practice charges or offered testimony against com- 
pany actions under the National Labor Relations Act; or refused to bargain 
collectively with elected representatives of their employees. 
Conversely, employers can bring charges of unfair labor practices against 
unions if unions restrained or coerced employees who were exercising their 
rights to engage in or refrain from engaging in collective bargaining; caused 
employers to discriminate against employee to encourage or discourage union 
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membership; refused to bargain in good faith; participated in certain types of 
strikes and secondary boycotts; charged excessive or discriminatory union ini- 
tiation fees or union dues; or caused employers to pay for labor services not 
performed (i.e., featherbedding). 
Arbitration cases include disputes that cannot be resolved within the bilat- 
eral grievance procedure. After all bilatefal steps in the grievance procedure 
have been exhausted, management and labor select an impartial outsider to 
decide the dispute. Often, this persons’ decision is stipulated in the contract 
to be final and binding upon both parties (Zabala 1983). 
The five-member board, appointed by the U.S. president, acts as a quasi- 
judicial body to decide cases on formal records, and it employs administrative 
law judges to hear and decide cases. All cases heard at the national level begin 
in regional offices, where regional directors process and investigate disputes. 
Appellate procedures exist within the board at the regional and national levels. 
Although the NLRB has no independent statutory power to enforce its deci- 
sions and orders, it may seek enforcement in the U.S. Court of Appeals. Grie- 
vants may also appeal board decisions to the federal judicial system. Arbitra- 
tion cases are administered and heard by the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service and other private associations, including the American 
Arbitration Association. 
The volume of disputes is high, nearly doubling between 1958 and 1974. 
The year 1980 had record levels, with 24,411 total disputes filed with the 
board. In 1981, the NLRB closed 52,804 cases, with 25,211 pending, and a 
record $37,617,144 was reimbursed to employees for illegal discharges or 
discriminatory representation. In many U.S. industries, such as the automo- 
bile industry, a large proportion of arbitration cases in recent years involved 
disciplinary layoffs and firings. An overwhelming number of these cases re- 
sult in reinstatement and backpay. 
Unfair labor practice disputes, or charges of unlawful acts by employers or 
unions or both, increased dramatically throughout the 1958-81 period, dou- 
bling by 1969 and with a maximum of 19,246 cases in 1980. In 1981, the 
board closed 41,020 unfair labor practices cases. Most cases are resolved in- 
formally: 90% of unfair labor practice cases are disposed of within 40 days 
without formal litigation, and only 3% of the cases require an NLRB decision. 
Strikes ended in 205 of the cases closed in 198 1, and collective bargaining 
commenced in 2,028 cases.2 
14.4.2 Japanese Dispute-Resolution Institutions 
The Japanese system has a strong resemblance to the U.S. system. This is 
because U.S. institutions served as models for many postwar economic insti- 
tutions established in Japan. Japanese statistics on dispute adjustment and un- 
fair labor practices are collected at the prefecture level and reported in the 
Annual Report of the Labor Relations Commissions. A network of local com- 
missions operating under central direction and review by the Central Labor 
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Relations Commission (LRC) is the primary institution for the resolution of 
labor disputes and data collection in Japan; grievance and other dispute- 
adjustment mechanisms at the enterprise level are more limited than in the 
United Sates. Thus, the Labor Relations Commission (LRC) has an active role 
in administering and developing Japanese labor relations. 
Dispute adjustment includes conciliation, mediation, and arbitration, as 
well as a semijudicial function that resolves unfair labor practice disputes. 
Moreover, LRCs perform major fact-finding activities prior to informal and 
formal negotiations. Lam (1983) has characterized the LRC’s dual function as 
a government conciliation agency and a labor court. Unlike the U.S. system, 
the LRC system often extends collective bargaining agreements to other trade 
unions and industries. The LRC system operates at the national level (Central 
Labor Relations Commission [CLRC]) and in each prefecture (Local Labor 
Relations Commcssions [LLRC]) and for the maritime industry (Seamen’s La- 
bor Relations Commission [SLRC]). 
The CLRC presides over interprefectural cases, cases of “national impor- 
tance,” and other appeals. The LLRCs preside over intraprefectural and pre- 
fectural disputes. (Hereafter, we refer to the total system as the LRC.) Unlike 
the U.S. NLRB, tripartite membership on LRCs includes equal numbers of 
representatives of employers, labor, and government. Consequently, LRCs are 
not formally subject to direct ministerial control. Revisions to the LRC legis- 
lation in 1949 limited authority in final LRC decisions in unfair labor practice 
disputes to public officials, because of adversarial company-union relations. 
Although most dispute cases in Japanese manufacturing are handled by 
conciliation and then mediation, in recent years differences between the two 
processes have largely disappeared. Conventional arbitration, which explic- 
itly acknowledges the adversarial relationship between parties, settles few dis- 
putes, since this technique does not conform to the Japanese tradition of com- 
promise between bargaining parties. Unfair labor practice disputes include an 
employer’s refusal to bargain, interference in union administration, or dis- 
missals of union leaders due to union activities. The role of LRCs in unfair 
labor practice disputes borrows more from civil court proceedings than does 
the U.S. system, which has cumbersome legal proceedings dominated by law- 
yers at all steps of negotiations. The average length of time to resolve disputes 
is substantial: for example, it took 635 days for LLRCs to resolve 1976 dis- 
putes and 774 days for those filed in 1980. 
14.4.3 
Typically, Japanese trade unions initiate dispute-adjustment cases, as in the 
United States. Some Japanese scholars have argued that a major difference 
between the U.S. and Japanese systems is that the level of informal dispute 
adjustment in Japan is much higher, although informal negotiation in the 
United States is also widespread. Since Japanese unions in the manufacturing 
Comparisons between U.S. and Japanese Trade Unions 
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sector are usually enterprise unions, we expect weak workplace bargaining, 
where Japanese-style dispute adjustment is a viable alternative. Japanese 
unions also use dispute adjustment to obtain satisfactory wage settlements as 
well as to make statements on social issues of national importance. 
Shimada (1982a) and Lam (1983) have pointed out that Japanese workers 
and their unions behave much like American workers and unions in formulat- 
ing their economic demands. Wage demands and demands to reduce the 
length of workdays and increase the number of holidays increased substan- 
tially during the period of rapid economic growth in the 1960s. In fact, until 
1975, wage disputes constituted 50% of all cases and declined only as eco- 
nomic growth slowed. With slower economic growth came decreased wage 
demands, reflecting job security fears and demands for “noneconomic” poli- 
cies. This behavior is similar to patterns in U.S. collective bargaining. 
In the United States, a formal, four-step grievance procedure is clearly 
specified and used to resolve disputes at unionized firms. This procedure is 
used to a lesser extent at nonunionized firms, and arbitration is used only as 
the final step to resolve conflicts (Zabala 1983). In Japan, the industrial rela- 
tions system does not include four-step grievance procedures at the plant 
level. LRCs replace workplace bargaining, an act that centralizes the dispute 
process but also creates inefficient settlements in terms of timeliness and pre- 
sumably policies that improve worker morale (Zabala 1983). Thus, we expect 
that the low volume of LRC cases reflects at least partial disenchantment 
among Japanese workers with this form of dispute resolution. 
In our previous work in the U.S. automobile industry, we used plant-level 
grievance data. As stated above, we analyze different dispute data for U.S. 
and Japanese manufacturing. Based on our earlier research, we suggest the 
following typology, Type I grievance data are labeled grievance rates (per 100 
employees), open grievance rates (e.g., unresolved grievances), and so on, 
collected by plant personnel as measures of shop tensions. Type 2 grievances 
are arbitration cases, which are primarily shop worker grievances, involving 
step-four grievance rates, based upon the failure of labor and management to 
resolve the disputes at the first three steps of the formal grievance procedure 
(Zabala 1983). Type 3a grievances are dispute-adjustment cases, including 
representation complaints and collective bargaining process complaints by 
unions. Type 3b grievance data are unfair labor practice cases. Type 3a, 3b 
grievance data are described above and are consistent between the two coun- 
tries. 
There is a systematic nonrepresentativeness in similar Japanese data series 
since the trade unions most prone to use dispute-adjustment procedures are 
those in the small- and medium-sized enterprises. Among the medium- and 
small-sized enterprises, there are more conventional adversary disputes com- 
mon to the United States. Hanami (1981) describes these relationships: “In- 
dustrial relations are conducted without established rules, governed by 
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emotional elements, and developed amid treacherous antagonism and mis- 
understanding.” Also, dispute rates are higher among smaller firms because 
young trade unions are fighting for new rights or new terrain for policies be- 
fore labor-management relationships are routinized. It is not surprising that in 
the small- and medium-sized firms, worker grievances often involve general 
economic and social discontent rather than plant-specific policies. Thus, the 
mediation of the LRCs is crucial for the resumption of consensual labor rela- 
tions. 
Nonrepresentativeness of the dispute data also occurs in the structures and 
processes of collective bargaining within each country. In the United States, 
adversarial collective bargaining includes substantial union voice for rank- 
and-file workers. In Japan, consensus decision making involves union, man- 
agers, work teams, and individual workers. The Japanese industrial relations 
system includes high levels of participation and formal and extensive infor- 
mation sharing. Disputes are minimized and problem-solving activities em- 
phasize production management, rather than policy development and imple- 
mentation in the collective bargaining framework. Joint problem solving takes 
place in formal and informal, regular and irregular meetings, quality circles, 
and work groups. Bilevel union representation involves (1) managers and 
union bargaining over basic pay rates, fringe benefits, working hours, and so 
on; and (2) joint consultation in strategic planning and corporate performance. 
There is some overlap however since bonus rates based on performance are 
determined in formal collective bargaining. Joint consultation meetings occur 
regularly at all levels of the enterprise-shop floor, plant, division, and cor- 
porate levels (Shimada and MacDuffie 1986). In the United States, grievances 
are policy devices used to interpret, revise, or develop new labor policies with 
attitude effects. In Japan, nonadversarial collective bargaining at the shop- 
floor level aids production and is not used for policy formation and implemen- 
tation. We cannot test Kamata’s thesis that Japanese workers have weaker 
shop-floor representation than American workers who labor in similar produc- 
tion environments but have dissimilar collective bargaining environments. We 
note the differences for future research. 
The number of labor disputes that bubble up to the national level in Japan 
need not be large if changes in the number indicate widespread changes in 
worker attitudes, with associated effects on costs. This is an empirical prob- 
lem: If the small number of disputes represent nothing but noise with respect 
to worker behavior, there will be very weak or no association with the cost of 
production; if the disputes correspond to significant cost and productivity- 
related manifestations of worker attitude, then the effect will be captured in 
the cost function. 
The number of dispute-adjustment cases in Japan declined dramatically 
during the recession that followed the energy crisis. During this period, the 
major type of dispute shifted to broader issues, such as working conditions, 
employment levels, and, notably, job security. There has also been a greater 
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tendency for trade unions to bargain directly with the government over general 
economic policy, as is done in Western Europe. This fact partly accounts for 
declines in wage disputes. At a deeper level, unions and management may 
have lost confidence in the LRC over time and, thus, turned to the central 
labor movement to provide satisfactory labor policies. With the changing na- 
ture of disputes, the variety of worker demands, and the maturation of work- 
place bargaining, unions, in particular, have found the LRC’s principle of 
compromise and delay ineffective in resolving worker grievances and discon- 
tents. Our findings in earlier studies suggest that worker-attitude indicators, 
for example, number of fact-finding cases, and enterprise grievance rates 
would be useful. 
14.5 Data 
For this paper, we use type 3a (dispute-adjustment cases) and type 3b (un- 
fair labor practice disputes) grievance data, strikes, and quits (United States 
only) as our behavioral data set to illuminate the relationships between worker 
attitudes and productivity in U.S. and Japanese manufacturing since the late 
1950s. Our decisions on data were based on availability and comparability 
between countries. We described the grievance data above. For Japanese man- 
ufacturing, the strike data are collected and published annually by the Minis- 
try of Labor. For the United States, strike and quit data are collected and 
published annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We believe that this set 
of behavior variables accurately depicts the sate of labor relations within the 
manufacturing sectors of both countries and can be used as attitude proxies to 
measure the impact of worker behavior on productivity and cost perform- 
ance. 
Data limitations prevented analysis of other behavior data. Shimada 
(1982b) challenges popular stereotypes of Japanese workers with his findings 
that Japanese labor turnover is quite high, and Levine and Koji (1980) argue 
that some part of turnover results from latent industrial conflict. These find- 
ings suggest that Japanese workers are not unlike their counterparts in U.S. 
industry and that “exit voice” might be a significant indicator of worker atti- 
tudes, and might proxy for their effects on productivity and costs in Japan. 
Although we use quits data in our model of the U.S. production process, we 
were unable to obtain satisfactory quit data for Japan. We were also unable to 
obtain absenteeism series for either country. We expect that these variables 
would be good indicators of attitudes for our models of production. Thus, we 
are unable to compare various “exit voice” data between countries in this re- 
search. 
Type 1 grievance data-actual grievance rates in unionized U.S. plants and 
the number of fact-finding cases by LRCs in Japanese plants-might provide 
useful information in our estimations, although U.S. coverage would account 
for less than 25% of all plants since the late 1970s because of declining union- 
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ization rates. These data were not available for this paper. We also believe that 
introducing positive measures of worker behavior-participation rates in 
team meetings, number of innovations and suggestions, voluntary participa- 
tion in training programs-would provide useful information in our model of 
production; but we were unable to obtain these data. 
The worker attitude indicators in the augmented cost function we estimate 
below are quits, Q (for the United States only); strikes, Z; dispute-adjustment 
cases, A; and unfair labor practices disputes, U. The variables Q and Z are 
published for U.S. manufacturing by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and for 
Japanese manufacturing by the Ministry of Labor. The variables A and U are 
compiled for U.S. manufacturing enterprises by the NLRB and for Japanese 
industry by the LRC, an autonomous agency of the Ministry of Labor. These 
data represent full coverage and are reasonably representative of worker atti- 
tudes at this level of aggregation; they are routinely collected for both union 
and nonunion enterprises, although actions from unionized establishments 
dominate the NLRB’s agenda. The importance of the variables Q and 2 as 
indicators of worker attitudes has been argued in earlier work by Norsworthy 
and Zabala (1985a, 1985b, 198%). 
Cost data for Japan are from Norsworthy and Malmquist (1983). Capital 
input is a Tornqvist (Divisia) aggregate of structures, transportation equip- 
ment, other equipment, land, and inventories. The aggregation is based on 
capital service prices computed using an internal rate of return following Gol- 
lop and Jorgenson (1 980). Capital stocks were developed from investment 
data taken from the Census of Manufactures, using the perpetual inventory 
method with geometric decay. Depreciation rates were taken from Nishimizu 
(1979). 
The only difference between the data for Japan in that study and this one is 
that the labor input here is disaggregated to production worker and nonprod- 
uction worker components. We believe this separation is appropriate for the 
study of worker attitudes since the two groups are affected differently by tech- 
nology and output growth. Energy and materials inputs and further details 
about data construction are provided in the earlier study. 
For the U.S. manufacturing sector, we have used a preliminary version of 
the new Berndt-Wood data set, which permits us to add the years 1978-81 to 
the data for U.S. manufacturing used by Norsworthy and Malmquist (1983). 
Capital stock data are for equipment and structures only, and energy input 
includes feedstocks, unlike the U.S. data in the earlier paper. 
In both countries, there are delays between the onset of a labor dispute and 
its final resolution. For the United States, we entered adjusted disputes for the 
following year to reflect delays in settlements. We used unfair labor practice 
disputes for the following year and dispute-adjustment cases for the second 
following year for Japan to allow for the effects of delays in dispute resolu- 
tion. 
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14.6 The Model 
The translog cost model has been used widely in a variety of studies in the 
last decade and has clearly surpassed the Cobb-Douglas function and the con- 
stant elasticity of substitution specifications as the model of choice for repre- 
senting the production p ro~ess .~  For this application, we use an equilibrium 
unit cost function model to estimate the effects of worker attitudes: an equilib- 
rium formulation because the appropriate valuation of capital input in disequi- 
librium is open to debate and a unit cost model (which imposes constant re- 
turns to scale) because scale effects are difficult to identify in aggregate time- 
series models. In general, the equilibrium translog model usually tracks the 
estimation period reasonably well, although it has its detractors.s The translog 
cost function is a logarithmic approximation to an arbitrary twice differenti- 
able cost function based on a Taylor series expansion around the point In C = 
0. We recognize five input factors: capital 8, production-worker labor (I,), 
nonproduction-worker labor (N), energy (E) ,  and materials (M). 
Thus, the general cost function may be written: 
c = C(y, 
whereY is output, Pi is the price of input i, and T is a time trend, often de- 
scribed as an index of technical change. Denoting logs by lower case charac- 
ters, the translog cost function is written 
lnC, = a, + & z i p i  + ‘/z ZiZjui jp ip j  
+ s 7  + ZisTipiT + ‘/z sTTT2 
+ ayy  + Ziaiypiy+ ’/z ayyy2, 
i ,  j = K, L, N ,  E ,  M. 
For the unit cost function, we restrict uy = 1, uiy = urn = 0. For convenience, 
we then subtract Y from both sides, thus 
1nC = lnC, - k: 
denotes the logarithm of the total unit cost of production. Further, to save 
estimated parameters (a concern because there are so few observations for 
manufacturing in Japan), we impose the restriction 
(1) 
s, = 0. 
Homogeneity of degree one in input prices is imposed by the following 
parameter restrictions: 
Ciai = 1, 
Z i U i j  = Z j U i j  = 0, 
xisTi = 0. 
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Under the assumption of cost minimization, Shephard’s lemma implies that 
the equations for the shares of each input factor in total unit production cost 
are equal to the elasticities of total cost with respect to the input prices: 
(2) i = K ,  L ,  N ,  E ,  M. 
The conventional practice is to estimate the cost function jointly with all but 
one of the share equations. This, then, is the form for estimating the standard 
translog cost function models. 
To include the effects of worker attitudes, we augment the cost function by 
inserting (the logs of) the worker-attitude indicators discussed above, just as 
we would introduce any other nonpurchased inputs that might affect the pro- 
duction process.6 The augmented unit cost function then becomes 
s, = dlnC/dp, = a, + 2,qJpJ + sT,T, 
c = c ( p , ,  R&, 
where 
R,, k = A ,  U, Q,  Z, 
respectively, denote adjusted disputes (A), unfair labor practices (U), quits 
(Q), and strikes (3, where r, = log (Rk). 
Then, the translog approximation to this unit-cost function is: 
1nC = a, + 2, a,p, + 1/22., 2Ja,Jp,pJ 
(3) + ’TT + ccsT8Pz 
+ C,c,r, + ‘/2 2, CIckIrkrI 
+ z/ zk ‘tkPzrk? 
where 
i = K ,  L ,  N ,  E ,  M, 
k = A, Q ,  U ,  Z. 
Thus, the indicators of worker attitude have first- and second-order influ- 
ences on production costs just as do the conventional inputs, and the indica- 
tors interact with the inputs as well as with each other. 
Under this specification, the share equations then become 
(4) S, = a, f CJUIJPJ  + S , T  + 2 k C , k r & ’  
The augmented cost function is then estimated jointly with four of the five 
share equations. Zabala (1983) has found that behavioral expressions of 
worker attitude in response to the work environment typically operate with a 
lagged effect. Thus, it is labor policies and work conditions of the recent past 
that give rise to behaviors in the present. While acute changes in conditions 
have more immediate results, this generally lagged effect reduces the problem 
of simultaneous determination of attitudes and the quantities of input factors 
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(input prices are assumed exogenous). Vestiges of bias from simultaneous de- 
termination can certainly remain in the estimates we present below.’ 
Given estimates of the augmented cost functions, we may determine the 
elasticity of the cost of production with respect to each of the attitude indica- 
tors by 
where 
i = K ,  L ,  N ,  E,  M ,  
k = A, Q,  U, Z .  
The effects on marginal cost of indicator r, is then given by 
(6) XIdR,  = CIR, x alnclalnr,. 
Finally, we may construct a measure of the effects of attitudes on production 
costs by weighting the indices of the attitude indicators by their respective 
marginal costs and summing. Thus, 
(7) Z,,, = C x (Z,dlnClalnr, x lIR,), k = A, Q,  U, Z. 
In any year, the proportional change in production costs due to negative 
attitudes-which is the negative of the corresponding change in total factor 
productivity-will be 
(8) d = ZW/C = Ek d InCldr, 
To avoid the difficulties of comparing the productivity and cost differences 
between the two countries in common currency terms, we will simply use the 
annual values of d from equation (8) for comparison. 
14.7 Empirical Analysis 
14.7.1 Estimation Results 1 
The augmented cost function models were estimated for the manufacturing 
sectors of Japan and the United States for the periods 1965-78 and 1958-80, 
respectively. The results for Japanese manufacturing are shown in table 14.1. 
Due to homogeneity restrictions, the cost function parameters associated with 
materials (M) are not estimated directly; similarly, the second-order parame- 
ters for strikes, Z, are not estimated, but are inferred from existing parame- 
ters. 
Table 14.2 shows the estimated own-Allen partial elasticities of substitu- 
tion, and table 14.3 the cost elasticities associated with each of the worker 
attitude indicators. Tables 14.4, 14.5, and 14.6 show corresponding results 
for U.S. manufacturing. Table 14.7 below shows the total cost elasticities for 
the two manufacturing sectors for their respective estimation periods. 
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Table 14.1 Estimated Cast Function Model, Japanese Manufacturing, 1965-78 
Parameter Estimated Standard 
Name Value Error t-statistic 
A 0  
AK 
AL 
AN 
AE 
AKL 
AKN 
AKE 
ALN 
ALE 
ANE 
ST 
STK 
STL 
m 
STE 
ALL 
ANN 
CA 
cu 
cz 
CAU 
CAZ 
cuz 
CKA 
CKU 
CLA 
CLU 
CNA 
GNU 
CEA 
CEU 
11.1011 
.265802 
.08738 1 
.029563 
.a21912 
- .036751 
- .021098 
.011714 
,021316 
.018580 
,092085 
.068900 
,092177 
,001638 
- .GO4338 
- .019278 
- .029958 
-.131481 
- ,012916 
.083229 
.111858 
,152060 
,140907 
.052999 
- ,058823 
,031360 
- .009759 
.003314 
- .002601 
- .009982 
,012355 
- .202413 
.014988 
.009219 
.a01692 
.o00622 
.001630 
.005984 
,003334 
.004494 
.012364 
,004498 
.001818 
.MI2807 
,001929 
.001357 
.OOO666 
.oO0793 
.013726 
.014451 
.046428 
.053591 
.05494 1 
,057921 
.033932 
.140785 
.016864 
.016082 
.MI36767 
,0037954 
.0014169 
,0014674 
.003 1332 
.0027863 
740.631 
28.8306 
51.6274 
47.4553 
13.4397 
- 6.14067 
-6.21719 
2.60624 
1.72426 
4.13002 
5.06482 
-4.59982 
3.57173 
.67909 
2.45800 
- 5.46565 
- 1.40445 
- 2.07308 
- 2.83191 
1.55302 
2.03593 
2.62528 
4.15259 
- 1.43377 
3.14265 
- 3.65769 
3.70004 
- 2.57127 
2.33965 
- 1.77245 
-3.18601 
4.50542 
Note: Key to parameter names: K = capital; L = production-worker labor; N = nonproduction- 
worker labor; E = energy; A = disputes adjustments; U = unfair labor practices; Z = strikes. 
In preliminary estimates of the cost functions without the worker-attitude 
indicators, both sectors exhibited nonconcavity in early years for capital and 
energy prices. Concavity was imposed by restricting the a, and uEE parame- 
ters to zero. For Japan, this had the added benefit of reducing the number of 
parameters to be estimated. In consequence, all the own-Allen partial elastic- 
ities of substitution have the correct sign, and the corresponding input factor 
demand schedules are downward sloping. 
In Japan, the average annual rate of cost change, given by the sT parameter, 
is - .0129, corresponding to total factor productivity growth of 1.29% per 
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Table 14.2 Own-Allen Partial Elasticities of Substitution for Japan, 1965-78 
Production- Nonproduction- 
Worker Worker 
Year Capital Labor Labor Energy Materials 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
-3.19715 
-2.88712 
- 2.83564 
- 2.89788 
- 2.94922 
- 2.88089 
- 3.26449 
-2.76220 
- 3.02002 
-3.30986 
-3.27200 
-3.27539 
-3.64671 
- 3.39022 
- 14.9715 
- 14.0569 
- 14.1467 
- 15.0820 
- 14.9954 
- 14.8450 
- 14.4085 
- 12.9708 
- 12.8735 
- 13.0715 
- 12.5813 
- 12.6501 
- 12.3814 
- 12.3100 
-91.8636 
-82.6761 
-84.7511 
- 88.5929 
- 88.0302 
- 80.9179 
-73.4642 
-67.1035 
-62.7135 
-60.1869 
- 55.5272 
- 56.5135 
- 5 1.8016 
- 5 1.8388 
- 3 1.7277 
-37.3110 
-38.1942 
- 37.4315 
-35.8958 
- 37.4542 
- 34.2569 
- 44.6362 
- 37.0063 
- 27.0552 
- 26.6714 
- 26.4505 
- 24.9059 
- 28.1690 
,699319 
,759410 
- ,765745 
- 740769 
- ,734760 
- ,570955 
- ,699768 
- .80184O 
- 767647 
- .744338 
- 765644 
- ,763571 
- ,724170 
- .750163 
Table 14.3 Cost Elasticities for Attitude Indicators for Japan, 1965-68 
Disputes Referred Unfair Labor 
to LRCs Practice Charges Strikes 
1965 - .077932 .135806 .0114178 
1966 - .159589 .169528 ,0575843 
1967 - .187181 .196407 ,0571942 
1968 - .110320 ,110666 .0661729 
1969 - ,123840 ,134979 .0538747 
1970 - .938256 ,0750949 .0810498 
1971 - ,002877 .0542922 ,0124814 
1972 - .131481 .0932289 .111858 
1973 - .038643 .0478906 ,0432072 
1974 ,122801 - .a29827 - .0464368 
1975 .lo6955 - .0195364 - .0558456 
1976 ,106401 .0083032 - .0869417 
1977 ,140026 .0562864 - .169113 
1978 .088802 .0717245 - .129844 
year. The trend in relative input factor utilization not accounted for by other 
factors in the model-often called biased technical change-is positive for 
capital and production and nonproduction worker labor, and negative for en- 
ergy and materials. 
For the United States, the average annual rate of total factor productivity 
growth is 0.7% per year, and unexplained trends in relative factor intensity 
are positive for capital, nonproduction labor, and materials, and negative for 
production worker labor and energy. 
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Table 14.4 Estimated Cost Function Model for U.S. Manufacturing, 1958-80 
Parameter Estimated Value SE t-statistic 
A 0  
AK 
AL 
AN 
AE 
AKL 
AKN 
AKE 
ALN 
ALE 
ANE 
ST 
STK 
STL 
STN 
STE 
ALL 
ANN 
CA 
cu 
CQ 
cz 
CAU 
CAZ 
cuz 
CAQ 
CUQ 
CQZ 
CKA 
CKU 
CKQ 
CLA 
CLU 
CLQ 
CNA 
CNU 
CNQ 
CEA 
CEU 
CEQ 
6.65346 
.019490 
,289242 
,081622 
.062455 
- ,058193 
- ,066572 
.031369 
,005487 
- ,014506 
.031923 
.004050 
- ,001519 
,001888 
- ,001996 
.094837 
- ,002821 
- .004804 
- ,021224 
- ,040594 
,158377 
,009580 
.348573 
,000040 
- ,104289 
,111645 
.167533 
.044169 
- ,071363 
.020346 
.OOO898 
- ,008909 
,013794 
,025954 
- ,042870 
.016772 
- .020889 
,037555 
- ,023857 
- .007080 
- 
.0164108 
,012274 
,00591 1 
.008199 
,005647 
.007444 
.004707 
,003553 
,005186 
.005917 
,00291 1 
.002273 
,001683 
.OOO804 
.001121 
.OOO782 
,0149 17 
,004528 
.049558 
,016846 
.037786 
,2499 15 
.I13167 
,046656 
.044527 
.02 1427 
,049301 
,21321 
,022534 
.O 10753 
,009380 
.010234 
,005043 
,014041 
.014845 
,007154 
,010317 
.lo8701 
,004933 
. ,03061 
405.433 
1.58793 
9.95484 
- 7.9 1687 
8.5631 1 
1.05808 
-2.45165 
10.9644 
- 3.11453 
2.40576 
- 1.88807 
1.68377 
- 2.55326 
6.35745 
- ,62310 
- ,09694 
- .69333 
- 2.40973 
4.19134 
,38335 
3.08016 
.OOO87 
- 2.342 12 
5.21035 
3.398 12 
2.07164 
- 3.16678 
1.89206 
.09580 
- ,87052 
2.73494 
1.84840 
- 2.88783 
2.34445 
- 2.02464 
3.45495 
-4.83613 
48.9267 
11.0584 
- 14.1405 
~ 
Note. Q = quits; for other parameters, see table 14.1 above. SE = standard error. 
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Table 14.5 Own-Allen Partial Elasticities of Substitution for the United States, 
1956-80 
Production- Nonproduction- 
Capital Worker Labor Worker Labor Energy Materials 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
- 13.0789 
- 13.3746 
- 13.9458 
- 14.2307 
- 14.6426 
- 16.2070 
- 17.4828 
- 14.5656 
- 12.7360 
- 13.8096 
- 15.2027 
- 16.0053 
- 20.1943 
- 22.9103 
- 19.9003 
- 14.2169 
- 11.9761 
- 13.431 1 
- 13.4141 
- 15.7005 
- 13.0729 
- 13.8871 
- 14.5727 
- 1.38246 
- 1.38973 
- 1.35576 
- 1.37053 
- 1.363% 
- 1.34402 
- 1.35057 
- 1.36023 
- 1.34296 
- 1.33280 
- 1.34620 
- 1.30455 
- 1.31052 
- 1.33241 
- 1.36750 
- 1.37694 
- 1.45099 
- 1.45047 
- 1.49092 
- 1.47753 
- 1.46812 
- 1.49505 
- 1.55272 
-8.46371 
-9.61571 
-8.31190 
- 8.59380 
- 8.58289 
-8.37832 
-8.62148 
- 8.74267 
-8.17741 
-8.04691 
- 8.73380 
-7.98864 
- 8.25295 
- 8.74542 
-9.85762 
-9.19305 
-8.66048 
- 8.26527 
- 9.49470 
- 9.65428 
- 9.57869 
-9.36756 
- 10.1319 
-20.8431 
- 19.7145 
-23.8269 
- 22.1218 
- 23.0257 
-23.7549 
-22,3701 
- 25.3 102 
-32.2869 
- 30.7266 
-26.3132 
- 29.1096 
- 23.1352 
- 19.5600 
- 19.6281 
- 2 1.9709 
- 15.9872 
- 13.8791 
- 12.5652 
- 11.7283 
- 12.2343 
- 11.1454 
- 9.22754 
- 1.19678 
- 1.10188 
- 1.19009 
-1.16641 
- 1.15887 
- 1.15918 
- 1.13221 
- 1.13999 
-1.19170 
-1.19285 
- 1.13808 
- 1.19553 
- 1.15776 
- 1.11722 
- 1.06015 
- 1.13272 
- 1.19708 
- 1.22186 
-1.14427 
- 1.13247 
- 1.14343 
- 1.17406 
- 1.12755 
14.7.2 Estimation Results 2 
The first-order effects of the attitude indicators are measured by the param- 
eters c, c,, c,, and, in the United States, cQ. Second-order effects are mea- 
sured by the parameters cm, caz, and csz (with additional terms for Q in the U. S. 
model) and interactions with input factors by ci,; that is, cm is the partial effect 
of adjusted disputes on capital requirements, and so on. 
The overall cost effects of each of the indicators are shown in tables 14.3 
and 14.6, and of their sum in table 14.7. In overall terms, the effects in the 
United States of attitudes as manifested in production costs and productivity 
were to raise production costs and reduce total factor productivity by about 
8% in the late 1950s and 1960s, rising more rapidly in the 1970s to about 11% 
in the late 1970s. The effects in Japan were to raise costs and to reduce total 
factor productivity by nearly 7% in 1965. This effect declines slowly to 1973 
and rather sharply thereafter to about 3% in 1978. These rates are not espe- 
cially large, compared to the U.S. auto industry where total cost elasticity 
with respect to better indicators of worker attitude was .24. 
428 A. C. LadJ.  R. NorsworthyIC. A. Zabala 
Table 14.6 Cost Elasticities for Attitude Indicators for the United States, 
1958-80 
Disputes Referred Unfair Labor Quit 
Year to NLRB Practice Charges Rate Strikes 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
,090266 
,068860 
- ,009884 
- .003617 
.012163 
- ,020722 
- ,013556 
. m 3 1  
.008164 
.025306 
,076332 
,094563 
,075721 
.07 1379 
- ,004804 
.009712 
,146048 
.024073 
.055679 
.119205 
,036554 
,085484 
.056910 
,0075699 
.0053790 
,0137394 
- ,0098877 
.0020485 
- .0069601 
- ,0130771 
.0099952 
.05 13433 
,0360233 
.0293724 
.0419415 
.0106047 
- ,0317793 
- ,0212241 
,015395 1 
.0155280 
- .045 1 165 
- .0481791 
- .0505240 
- ,0360443 
- .0334776 
- ,688292 
.0217394 
- ,0067716 
.0386882 
- .0114907 
- .0225933 
- .0289838 
- .0237373 
- ,0482822 
- ,0939478 
- .0673207 
- ,0487660 
- ,0448769 
- .0724908 
.0240316 
- ,0405943 
- ,0673164 
.0139675 
,0418093 
.0394685 
.07 17341 
,0148252 
,042 1227 
,0658762 
- ,036681 
,014494 
. I17814 
.I08095 
.9 16 150 
,139392 
.I33747 
.116357 
. I  19848 
.091344 
.029308 
- .003863 
,019357 
.026299 
,137910 
- ,073212 
,094710 
,059970 
- ,031496 
,09605 1 
,021725 
.065809 
. 158377 
This contrast between worker-attitude effects through time in Japan and the 
United States corresponds to the finding in Norsworthy and Malmquist (1983) 
that total factor productivity rose in U.S. manufacturing somewhat more 
slowly (.7%-1 .O%) before 1973 but slowed down in the United States to about 
.5% per year after the energy crisis of 1973, while it accelerated in Japan to 
about 1.4% per year. 
In the U.S. automobile industry, Norsworthy and Zabala (1985b), using 
similar methods, found a strong cyclical component to worker attitudes-the 
negative effects of worker attitudes were stronger in expansions and weaker in 
recessions. No such pattern appears in the aggregate U.S. manufacturing sec- 
tor in this study. In Japan, however, there is a substantial reduction in the 
negative effect of attitudes after 1973. In the pre-1973 period, output was 
growing rapidly in Japan’s manufacturing sector-about 12% per year, and 
employment of production and nonproduction workers was slowly increasing. 
Between 1974 and 1978, however, labor input in Japan was reduced by more 
than lo%, and output grew far more slowly than before. It is reasonable to 
conclude, therefore, that similar cyclical forces that restrained the overt 
expression of worker attitudes in cost-increasing and productivity-reducing 
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Table 14.7 Total Cost Elasticities for Worker-Attitude Indicators, The United 
States and Japan 
Year United States Japan 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
I969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
,0825843 
,0819522 
,082981 1 
.0830990 
,0832336 
.0827259 
,0833753 
.0841020 
.0854080 
.0853532 
.0862477 
.0877652 
,0888898 
.0899309 
,0917536 
.0957011 
.010227 1 
.O 105476 
.0106940 
.0108919 
.0111386 
.0115855 
.0119767 
.0692909 
,0675235 
.0664205 
.0665192 
.0650138 
.0623191 
.0638965 
.0636063 
,0524545 
.0333817 
.0315735 
.0277625 
.0271993 
.0306832 
behaviors in the U.S. auto industry also had that effect in Japanese manufac- 
turing after 1973. Indeed, if there is a mystery in the conclusions of this study, 
it must be: Why were the negative effects of worker attitudes in U. S . manufac- 
turing not damped by the post-1973 recession? 
The answer may simply be that we do not have a sufficiently sensitive 
model of U.S. manufacturing to capture these effects. Or that, unlike autos, 
formal shop dispute-resolution processes are less efficient, and manufacturers 
rely more on arbitration and mediation services for outside intervention in 
labor relations. 
In particular, the statistics of the national dispute-resolution process in Ja- 
pan may reasonably well reflect the attitudes of Japanese workers, because it 
is the primary formal organization for managing labor-management conflict. 
In the United States, by contrast, considerable use is made of the grievance 
machinery in unionized plants. In the U.S. automobile industry, we found 
grievance statistics to be sensitive indicators of productivity- and cost-related 
worker attitudes, and the same may be true for other unionized sectors, with 
the result that statistics of formal submission of labor disputes to third parties 
are less useful in the United States than in Japan as indicators of worker atti- 
tude. 
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14.8 Recent Developments in Labor Relations and 
Productivity in Japan 
Despite vast differences between the Japanese and U.S. economies, fash- 
ions in U.S. economic policies, national and corporate, are often communi- 
cable and, at times, highly contagious for Japan. For example, Japan is cur- 
rently undergoing waves of deregulation of industry and of privatization of 
government-operated enterprises similar to that which began in the United 
States in the late 1970s. Similarly, in the United States, the Japanese style of 
management has been widely discussed, and many U.S. firms have experi- 
mented with different labor and general management practices, for example, 
the team concept management system. 
Anything in Japanese management connected with productivity or product 
quality quickly obtains the attention of American business. 
One set of concerns that seems important is based not on the Japanese mys- 
tique, but on demographic trends: while the rate of growth of the Japanese 
economy has slowed down considerably in recent years, the widespread prac- 
tice of early retirement (between ages 55 and 60 for many large enterprises) is 
straining the capacity of those enterprises to retire members of the cohort now 
reaching retirement age. Japan, virtually alone among major industrial coun- 
tries, had a “baby boom” in the 1930’s, and that group would normally retire 
between 1985 and 2000. This is the same large group that has recently passed 
through its most productive years. Throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s, 
while the U.S. labor force (1) grew younger and less experienced by absorb- 
ing the postwar U.S. baby boom and (2) increased in female participation, the 
Japanese labor force was growing older and more experienced. In conven- 
tional labor quality terms (see, e.g., Gollop and Jorgenson, 1980), the Japa- 
nese labor force was improving while the U.S. labor force was declining in 
productive capacity. Those trends are now reversing. The Japanese baby boom 
cohort is due for retirement even as the U.S. baby boom cohort is just entering 
its most productive years. Other things equal, this portends well for produc- 
tivity in the United States relative to Japan. The demographic pattern men- 
tioned above created another type of stress in the Japanese system that may 
tend to worsen worker attitudes. Rapid output growth-in excess of 10% per 
year in manufacturing-created employment and promotion opportunities 
even when accompanied by rapid labor productivity growth. Slower growth, 
and the somewhat delayed retirement of the Japanese workers approaching 
retirement age, has slowed down the growth of jobs, particularly in high qual- 
ity, management-tracked jobs, even as Japanese universities are producing 
highly qualified graduates in record numbers. The scarcity of good jobs and 
promotion opportunities may lead to somewhat less favorable attitudes on the 
part of new labor force entrants. Indeed, some Japanese businessmen have 
been saying for several years that younger workers take for granted the pay 
and working conditions that their predecessors found very satisfying. 
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14.9 Summary 
Compared to U.S. manufacturing, we find lower effects in Japan of negative 
attitudes. Japanese manufacturing plants are also characterized by nonadver- 
sarial collective bargaining, with lower grievance rates, fewer unresolved 
grievances, fewer strikes, and higher in-process quality audits. 
The empirical evidence concerning the effects of worker attitudes on pro- 
ductivity in Japan and the United States is consistent with the widespread idea 
that Japan’s system of conflict resolution-for the manufacturing sector, at 
least-is more efficient than the U.S. system in terms of productivity and 
costs. An alternative interpretation is that there is less potential for conflict in 
labor-management relations in Japanese manufacturing. Our finding of lower 
negative effects cannot distinguish these explanations. Another hypothesis to 
test is that, in future years, as Japanese business experiences the usual cycles, 
top-heavy bargaining will cause erosion in both trade union and employee 
commitment, as that which occurred at Nippon Steel Corporation in 1979 and 
the early 1980s. 
Notes 
1. Our work to date has focused primarily on the U.S. automobile industry, where 
we have forged a quantitative link between worker attitudes, measured in an objective 
and reproducible way, and the productivity and cost of production (Norsworthy and 
Zabala 1982; 1985a, 1985b, 198%). That link is quantitatively important, and the 
worker-attitude index is robust, as we have shown for different econometric specifica- 
tions (Norsworthy and Zabala 1990). We are currently engaged in a cross-sectional 
plant-level study of the U.S. Postal Service that studies a more limited set of worker- 
attitude indicators, but includes the effects of selected management policies on worker- 
attitude formation as well as the effects of worker attitude on productivity and costs 
(Norsworthy and Jang 1989). 
2. We should point out that there are significant policy shifts in dispute outcomes in 
an agency whose leading members change with each new administration, suggesting 
four-year cycle effects (Sockell and Delaney 1987). We do not account for these effects 
in this paper. 
3. Type 3a and 3b grievance data cannot be described as worker-attitude proxies 
since they include disputes by management as well as trade union and employees. See 
discussion of shun-to in sec. 14.3 above; also see sec. 14.4 above. A pure type 3 
worker-attitude variable should be purged of disputes sent to the NLRB by manage- 
ment. We could not obtain such a measure for this paper. The other behavioral data are 
consistent with our earlier research with worker-attitude data. 
4. Binswanger (1974) presents an exceptionally clear description, which we will 
not repeat here. 
5 .  The counterculture in production modeling claims (with some merit) that the 
equilibrium model tracks well because the (ex post) service price of capital adjusts to a 
level consistent with the quantity of capital input, rather than the reverse. Norsworthy 
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and Zabala (1985~) hold that an explicit disequilibrium model is preferable for measur- 
ing the effects of worker attitudes on the level and value of capital input. 
6. Norsworthy and Zabala (1985b); see also F. R. Lichtenberg (1981). 
7. The instrumental variables solution is an approach to dealing with the simultane- 
ity issue. A preferred solution would be to augment the model with explicit represen- 
tation of the formation of worker attitudes by labor policies based on technology, and 
other conditions of work. For the total manufacturing sector, it would be very difficult 
to develop any but the most general attitude-formation model. At the industry and plant 
levels, it may be possible to measure some of the important determinants of worker 
attitudes required to extend the production model to encompass attitude formation. 
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Comment Mary Jean Bowman 
This paper-along with others published by Norsworthy and Zabala since 
1982 and on up to the present time-starts with the proposition that worker 
attitudes affect total cost, cost structures, and productivity and that attitude 
indicators should be added to conventional production functions. This they do 
for manufacturing in Japan over the years 1965-78 and in the United States 
over the years 1958-80. Their analysis makes use of an equilibrium translog 
cost function and its production dual, entailing the crucial assumptions of cost 
minimization and constant returns to scale. 
The availability and selection of attitude indicators is critical to such an 
endeavor. So also, in the present case, are the institutional contexts and their 
implications for interpretation of those indicators. The contribution by Lam 
et al. provides an essential and insightful comparison of the Japanese and U S .  
systems for settlement of industrial disputes. 
Attitudes are measured indirectly, using observable forms of behavior as 
indicators. This is not a study of what explains the behavior-let alone the 
unobserved “attitudes” and how these relate to the systems for settlement of 
disputes. Empirically, it is in fact the latter that are entered in the regressions, 
as the title of this paper, though not its underlying argument, suggests. For 
Mary Jean Bowman is professor emeritus, Department of Economics and Education, University 
of Chicago. 
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both Japan and the United States the “attitude indicators” are: A, disputes 
referred for solution to the LRCs in Japan and the NLRB in the United States; 
U, unfair labor practice charges; Z, strikes. Only in the United States did they 
have quit rates, Q. 
The cost function in the basic model, without worker attitudes, incorporates 
five input variables (physical capital, production workers, nonproduction 
workers, energy, and materials). Time trend T is taken to represent technolog- 
ical change, which is interacted with the other input variables. Attitude vari- 
ables are then inserted, interacting these variables with each of the conven- 
tional inputs, and the estimated cost function is estimated jointly with four of 
the five share equations. This provides the basis for estimating the elasticity 
of the total cost of production with respect to each of the attitude indicators. 
Finally, the authors construct an overall measure of effects of attitudes on pro- 
duction costs by weighting the attitude indicators by their respective marginal 
costs. 
I have two questions relating to methodology. First, the assumption of con- 
stant returns to scale and the assumption that time trend T stands for techno- 
logical change evade the perennial problem of sorting out economies of scale 
and technological change stressed earlier by Nadiri. This is common enough. 
But we must ask, nevertheless, What in fact may T be saying? Perhaps there 
is a special problem here in view of the changes that have occurred over the 
years covered in the experiences and roles of the LRCs in Japan. Has the 
assumption that T is exogenously determined technological change blocked 
thinking about interactions between changing structures and the attitude indi- 
cators? 
Second, even setting aside unavoidable problems in making cross-national 
comparisons, a problem is created in the inclusion of Q for the United States 
but not for Japan. This would seem to invalidate the comparisons of “total” 
attitude effects in the two countries. But even if Q were available for Japan 
there would be a dilemma here. Although turnover is considerably higher in 
Japan than often is assumed, the lack of data on quits in Japan may not be 
accidental, and especially, perhaps, with reference to manufacturing industry 
over the years covered. Furthermore, dissatisfaction would have had to be 
more intense in Japan than in the United States before a Japanese worker 
would take the costly alternative of quitting. Differing age structures will be 
important in this respect as well. 
Some of the other findings raise questions that would seem to call for com- 
ment by the authors relating back to the systems of dealing with conflicts in 
Japan and in the United States and their histories. Putting tables 14.1 and 14.4 
side by side highlights, for example, the contrast between Japan and the 
United States in elasticities on nonproduction workers and on their interaction 
with physical capital. Does the shifting emphasis in LRC activities with in- 
creased white-collar involvement say something here? Also interesting are 
contrasts between the two countries in elasticities on the variable A, which, 
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taken alone, is more strongly negative in Japan than in the United States but 
becomes more strongly positive in interaction with production labor in Japan 
than in the United States. 
The authors point not only to the decline in total cost elasticities for worker- 
attitude indicators in Japan in the 1970s (not surprising) but also to a puzzling 
lack of such a change (even a slight increase in those elasticities) in the United 
States. I share their puzzlement, but this raises another question. Does using 
an optimizing constant-cost model create more of a problem in short-term 
shifts of capacity utilization in relation to worker behavior in the United States 
than in Japan? For that matter, what about the very different situations with 
respect to unemployment insurance in the two countries as a factor in these 
differences? 
While I still have some concern that contrasts between the situations and 
systems in Japan and in the United States may raise greater problems for em- 
pirical comparisons than the authors explicitly recognize, this most recent ver- 
sion of their paper is a big improvement in this respect. Moreover, the impor- 
tance of contrasts in demographic changes and associated time paths of aggre- 
gate productivity is now made explicit, albeit without explicit attention to the 
associated processes of in-firm human resource development. Do such consid- 
erations not weaken somewhat the case for incorporating attitudes in produc- 
tion functions, whatever their indicators? 
Very much to its credit, a study such as this raises many basic questions 
that go beyond anything that could be asked of the authors in one investiga- 
tion. As they recognize, “industrial conflict” is only one part of a broader 
interplay of incentive structures, rules of the game, how shirking is moni- 
tored, and personnel and human resource development policies generally in 
their relationships to worker attitudes and behavior. The sorting out of some 
of the commonalities and differences between Japan and the United States 
(and within each of these countries) in these respects is a challenge that may 
prove to be of rising importance in the future. 
